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EDITOR'S PREFACE 
The following four articles were prepared in anticipation of the 
Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, which was to have been held at the Syracuse Univer-
sity College of Law on April 5, 1975. Unfortunately, a paralyzing 
snowstorm on the weekend of the meeting forced a cancellation of 
the proceedings. 
The four papers published in this issue outline the proposed 
discussion. The remarks of Mr. Sassoon were prepared as an intro-
duction to a session on the necessary role of international financial 
institutions, while the article by Dean Alnasrawi which follows was 
scheduled as the keynote, presenting his overview of the petrodollar 
problem. Professor Pattillo, originally scheduled as a member of the 
panel discussing petromoney investment problems in the United 
States and elsewhere, subsequently submitted an analysis of bal-
ance of payments problems generated by the new petrofunds. Com-
pleting this section is the presentation scheduled to open the after-
noon session, an analysis by Professor Herzog of the response of the 
"European Community" to the petromoney imbalance. The eco-
nomic analyses of these articles, especially those of Mr. Sassoon and 
Dean Alnasrawi, are based upon data available at the time of con-
ference. 
The College of Law International Law Society would like to 
express its appreciation to those persons yet unmentioned who had 
graciously agreed to attend the Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting: 
Associate Professor Jon E. Bischel; Pierre De Ravel D'Esclapon, 
Esq.; James G. Evans, Jr., Esq.; Associate Professor George M. 
Frankfurter; Professor L.F.E. Goldie; Assistant Professor Douglass 
J. Klein; Professor Eric Lawson; Howard Mennell, Esq.; Lester 
Nurick, Esq.; and James E. Price, Esq. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss2/4
PETRODOLLARS-THE RECYCLING PROBLEM: 
SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
David M. Sassoon* 
Whatever the actual size and volume of surplus funds that 
ultimately accrue to the oil producing countries as a result of the 
quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973 and early 197 4, there is no 
doubt that a dramatic and unprecedented shift in financial re-
sources from the oil importing to the oil exporting countries has 
occurred. This trend will continue for at least the immediate future 
and probably will not reverse before the end of this decade, when 
new or alternative energy sources and changes in consumption pat-
terns may begin to show their effects. To be sure, early forecasts on 
the implications of the oil revolution painted a bleak prospect for 
the world at large, and particularly for the industrial world. It is 
now, however, generally accepted that the estimates of amounts in-
volved were exaggerated by many in the early crisis days, and have 
more recently been revised downward. These new and more modest 
estimates are the result of various factors. 
First, reduced demand has precipitated a substantial world-
wide decrease in the consumption of Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil. Overall production is re-
ported to be down some 20 percent from 30 million to 25 million 
barrels a day, and in some countries, notably Saudi Arabia, the 
reduction is even more massive. Even further declines are forecast 
as a result of warmer weather and increased supplies from non-
OPEC sources. In some instances, this reduction is apparently lead-
ing to lower prices for OPEC's crude oil (agreements to maintain 
price notwithstanding) and to sales on credit, which have the same 
effect. Witness the volte face in U.S. policy, which is now directed 
at obtaining an agreement on a minimum or floor price for oil, but 
which was originally directed at an all-out effort to reduce prices 
when the successive price hikes were first announced. Also indica-
tive is the February 1975 surplus in the U.S. balance of trade due 
to a huge decline in the oil import bill. 
Second, the OPEC nations have experienced unexpectedly 
large import costs, both in the magnitude or quantity of goods pur-
chased or on order and in price terms, the latter because the original 
surplus estimates apparently ignored the escalation in costs for im-
ported goods to the producing countries. 
* Attorney, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C .; 
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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Both of these factors have helped to reduce payment deficits in 
the industrial countries, virtually all of which have shown constant 
(and sometimes dramatic) improvement over the past several 
months. Quite apart from the various blessings in disguise that 
commentators now associate with the situation and the accelerated 
recession related thereto (for example, conservation efforts, an im-
petus to self-sufficiency in energy and in other resources, the anti-
inflationary effects of the recession, etc.), the problem appears less 
severe and more manageable than it was assumed when the first 
dire estimates, predictions, and alarms of impending disaster were 
sounded. 
The question which should be addressed, in my opinion, can be 
stated as follows: how do we best deal with the effect of the massive 
growth of funds that the small group of OPEC countries has at-
tained and will most likely continue to accumulate? In other words, 
how do we ensure that the enormous growth in OPEC purchasing 
power will be handled in a manner least likely to disrupt the mone-
tary and economic order of the world community at large? 
Before attempting even a brief analysis of the problem and of 
some of the possible answers, two preliminary observations should 
be noted. First, the solution to this problem is of equal concern to 
all countries. Producers and consumers alike share a real interest in 
maintaining a world monetary and economic order and in prevent-
ing a chaotic situation which would only be detrimental to all. 
Herein lies the realpolitik notion that, notwithstanding preoccupa-
tions regarding the short term effects of the energy crisis (for exam-
ple, issues relating to balance of payments deficits, the serious im-
pact on the poorest countries, or the political and other implications 
associated with embargo, discrimination, and boycott policies), 
there exists, in the final analysis, a mutual interest between produ-
cers and consumers in solving the problems through cooperation 
rather than confrontation. Put in different terms, there is a growing 
recognition of the communality of interest in a longer term point of 
view. While the industrial world needs energy, the producing states 
need reliable sources of revenue for development to produce higher 
and improved standards of living, to expand and maintain growing 
and diversifying economies (toward the day when petroleum re-
sources are depleted), and to establish more progressive and modern 
social infrastructures through the provision of health, education, 
welfare, and similar facilities or services which are still, at most, 
only marginally available in many of the oil exporting countries. 
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The second preliminary observation that ought to be made concerns 
the relation of the immediate problem under consideration to other 
problems which clearly are related to it. Most, if not all, of these 
other problems actually predate the explosion in oil prices. They 
include, for example, the increasing difficulty of the traditional 
banking channels to manage aggregate fund flows, galloping rates 
of inflation, high interest rates, and unstable exchange rates. All of 
these "hardships" were in existence before the final quarter of 1973 
and were only aggravated by OPEC oil pricing policies. The strain 
on the private banking system and the collapse of certain large 
banks (Herstatt, Franklin National, etc.)., though occurring last 
summer and preceded by the collapse of some 20 smaller banks all 
over the world , seem to have resulted more from the e·arlier 
disturbances mentioned than from the energy crisis itself. There-
fore, the problem which concerns us is the means by which a mu-
tually acceptable machinery, one that will not endanger the stabil-
ity of the financial system of the free world, can be devised. If 
international cooperation is the suggested remedy to this sudden 
transfer of wealth, then ignoring for the moment the shift in political 
power, the questions are: what are we to cooperate about, what 
shape ought this cooperation take, and how should this cooperation 
manifest itself? 
Until 1974, it was generally accepted that the world's capital 
markets could combine to function effectively and flexibly in ac-
cepting and recycling capital flows. Since 1974, however, the con-
currence of high oil prices, higher inflation, and recession in the 
industrial world has called this ability of the system into question, 
and has generated interest in developing recycling mechanisms 
which would replace or function in parallel with the traditional 
capital markets. I have mentioned the problems of inflation and 
recession in this context only because they have a direct bearing on 
the question under discussion. Under conditions of recession it be-
comes prohibitively expensive for industry to raise equity capital, 
while under conditions of inflation (calling for a monetary response 
through high interest rates) it becomes very costly to obtain debt 
capital. This combination of circumstances (that may now be 
changing, but which prevailed during the height of the energy crisis) 
is as bad for the oil or capital exporter who looks for security of 
investment as it is for the oil or capital importer. Because it was no 
longer possible for the traditional capital markets to borrow on short 
terms (as seems to have been the initial clear preference of the 
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managers of OPEC funds) and to lend long in the amounts avail-
able, growing amounts of surplus funds began being absorbed by 
governments through the issue of short term obligations, thereby 
causing the governments to assume a role hitherto reserved for the 
private banking sector. With the simultaneous intervention of cen-
tral banks in support of weaker banks in several of the industrial 
countries, governments were in effect playing an unprecedented and 
decisive role on both sides of capitalism's balance sheet, which they 
can expect to continue to do for some time to come. Thus, the first 
significant consequence of the recycling problem is the larger role 
that the central banks of the industrial countries have assumed in 
what used to be known as the private capital markets of the world. 
To this development add the following considerations: a grow-
ing volume of direct government-to-government transactions (that 
is, direct borrowings by industrial and developing countries from 
OPEC countries); ·direct placing of oil money with borrowers by 
using the private banks as intermediary brokers only, rather than 
as direct depositories of funds (for example, the recent South of 
Scotland Electricity Board $100 million and the British Shell Cor-
poration $200 million loans); the diversification of currencies (add-
ing marks, Swiss francs, and guilders to dollars and sterling, the 
traditional oil currencies) in which oil surplus funds are being held; 
the direction of funds to deficit countries through the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank), the International Development 
Association, and their traditional lending channels and through the 
three regional development banks (the Inter-American, Asian, and 
African Development Banks), and existing and newly created multi-
lateral and bilateral development lending institutions of OPEC 
countries, as well as through the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, United Nations Capital Development Fund, and the 
United Nations Emergency Operation machinery; and the closing 
of some of the traditional triangular capital markets or currency 
protection havens (by measures such as the penalties the Swiss 
recently imposed) to oil money. 
By contemplation of all these factors, one gets a clearer idea of 
some of the recycling forces already at play. Even though these 
processes have been described in banking circles as of "great signifi-
cance," it is not suggested that the problem is unmanageable. Quite 
the contrary, emergence of these processes indicates how versatile 
the system really is, in that it was strong or flexible enough to cope 
with the situation as it developed. Given certain adjustments and 
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modifications, it was able to absorb the OPEC surplus without seri-
ous dislocations, even in a period ofrecession when private demand 
for capital was extremely low and unemployment in many in-
dustrial countries, including the United States, reached levels ex-
ceeded only in the Great Depression of the 1930's. Far from produc-
ing a disaster, the redistribution of petrodollars during 1974 may in 
fact be considered a success story. To be sure, the foregoing recy-
cling mechanisms, plus the traditional investment channels (equity 
participation or purchase of other assets or property in the in-
dustrial world), may seem unsatisfactory to the oil producing coun-
tries because of their wish to eliminate or reduce the risks of default, 
currency depreciation, and even expropriation of assets, about 
which they exhibit growing apprehension. But these are the tradi-
tional risks associated with international capital transfers and 
flows, and there really is, in my opinion, no compelling reason why 
a special effort for ameliorating these risks ought to be mounted and 
new schemes devised for the special purpose of protecting oil export-
ers where others have had to accept exposure to them for so long. 
There is little doubt that the most serious victims of the energy 
crisis have been the poorest countries. They have suffered the real 
brunt of the oil price rise and have been the hardest hit through a 
deterioration in their terms of trade caused by the enormous in-
crease in oil prices and the economic recession in the industrial 
world. Although they have benefited to some extent from the recent 
rapid inflation, which has reduced the burden of their foreign debt 
to some extent, their overall capital needs and the cost of their 
development plans have increased appreciably. There is little doubt 
that the Third World has and will continue to pay the highest price 
in terms of widespread human suffering and misery for the energy 
crisis. The international organizations whose task it is to assist 
these countries (in particular the World Bank, and to some extent 
the IMF) have traditionally acted as cooperative institutions pro-
viding recycling mechanisms for the transfer of capital from surplus 
to deficit countries. The World Bank has over the past 25 years bor-
rowed increasing amounts of money in surplus or capital exporting 
countries, relending the borrowed funds to the developing or capital 
importing countries. Drawings under traditional IMF facilities are 
of a similar nature. They are designed to enable the needy to utilize 
the resources of those countries that have something to spare. Most 
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As international institutions, the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund clearly provide the framework for coopera-
tion; they are in a positidn to extend the technical know-how and 
assistance (the institution-building experience of World Bank pro-
jects) which the oil producing countries so urgently need in order to 
translate their new wealth into modern technology, and to provide 
a base for further growth in the future. The Bank and the Fund can 
borrow from the oil exporters and lend to the poor, who would then 
use the funds to purchase from the industrial nations the goods and 
services required for their development. The Bank and the Fund are 
in a position to provide security for the repayment of borrowed oil 
funds and to assume the risk of default of their own borrowers, for 
that is the manner in which they have operated in the past. Finally, 
they can best (on the basis of their vast and successful experience 
in development) ensure that the oil earnings are invested in the 
most economic and efficient projects, and so in large measure fulfill 
the needs and expectations of all. 
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